by gatewayconsulting | Jul 21, 2026 | BLOG, In the news
New Delhi, 21 July 2026
By Teekshna Singh
The Monsoon Session of Parliament commenced on July 20, 2026, and will continue until August 13, 2026, providing lawmakers with four weeks and 19 sittings to consider a wide-ranging legislative agenda. As one of the three annual sessions of Parliament, alongside the Budget and Winter Sessions, the Monsoon Session serves as a key platform for the introduction, debate, and passage of legislation.
Ahead of the commencement of the session, Prime Minister Narendra Modi called upon all political parties to ensure a productive session focused on legislative business and public welfare. However, proceedings in both Houses witnessed repeated disruptions on the opening day as Opposition parties sought discussions on issues including NEET, the Ram Mandir donation controversy, and other matters of public importance.
The government has prioritised the introduction and consideration of several significant Bills during the session while also preparing to deliberate on broader governance and policy issues expected to feature prominently in parliamentary discussions.
Legislative Agenda
At the start of the session, 28 Bills are pending before Parliament. Of these, the government has identified seven priority Bills, comprising five new legislations and two Bills carried over from previous sessions.
The Income Tax (Amendment) Bill, 2026 seeks to replace an ordinance exempting foreign investors from paying tax on interest and capital gains earned through investments in government securities. The proposed legislation also extends these exemptions to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and aims to attract foreign capital, strengthening India’s bond market, and improving financial stability amid global economic uncertainty.
The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 proposes to replace the ordinance issued in May 2026 that increased the sanctioned strength of the Supreme Court from 34 to 38 judges, including the Chief Justice of India. The amendment seeks to enhance the Court’s capacity to address its growing caseload.
The Registration of Births and Deaths (Amendment) Bill, 2026 proposes to modernise and digitise the country’s civil registration framework by streamlining the process for recording births and deaths.
The Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026 seeks to amend the 1971 Act by extending legal protection currently available to the National Anthem to the National Song, Vande Mataram. The Bill proposes that insulting or intentionally obstructing the singing of the National Song would constitute an offence punishable with imprisonment of up to three years, a fine, or both.
The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (Amendment) Bill, 2026 aims to update the 2006 MSME law to reflect the contemporary business environment. It seeks to strengthen the mechanism for addressing delayed payments to small businesses, facilitate the enforcement of arbitration awards, and provide States with greater flexibility in establishing Facilitation Councils, with the broader objective of improving the ease of doing business for MSMEs.
The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 introduces provisions governing the handling and management of foreign funds and assets held by organisations whose FCRA registrations have been cancelled. It also proposes reducing the maximum imprisonment for certain violations from five years to one year.
The Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan Bill, 2025, which was introduced during the Winter Session and later referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee, proposes the creation of a unified higher education regulator by merging the University Grants Commission (UGC), the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE).
Constitutional Amendment
Apart from the legislative agenda, Parliament is also expected to deliberate on the 130th Constitution Amendment Bill, which has attracted considerable attention. The proposed amendment provides for the automatic removal of a Prime Minister, Chief Minister, or Minister who remains under judicial custody for 30 consecutive days. A Joint Parliamentary Committee met on July 17 to finalise its report ahead of the Monsoon Session, paving the way for further parliamentary consideration. However, the government has yet to confirm whether a revised version of the Bill will be introduced during the upcoming session.
Parliamentary Priorities
An all-party meeting was convened ahead of the session to discuss the government’s legislative programme and facilitate coordination among political parties. Alongside the introduction and passage of Bills, the session is expected to witness discussions on governance, judicial reforms, education policy, taxation, economic development, and constitutional accountability.
With 19 sittings scheduled over four weeks, the Monsoon Session 2026 is expected to serve as an important platform for legislative action and political debate. The fate of several key Bills, along with the proposed constitutional amendment, will depend on parliamentary deliberations and consensus across both Houses during the course of the session.
by gatewayconsulting | Jul 10, 2026 | BLOG, In the news
New Delhi, 10 July 2026
By Teekshna Singh
The Government of NCT of Delhi (GNCTD) officially notified the ‘Delhi Electric Vehicle Policy, 2026’, effective from July 1, 2026, to March 31, 2030. The landmark policy comes against the backdrop of a CAQM (Commission for Air Quality Management) report that identified vehicular pollution as the primary contributor, accounting for 23% during winters in Delhi. Importantly, the report highlighted that two-wheelers constituted approximately 67% of the total number of vehicles in Delhi, making a case for their rapid electrification to achieve a reduction in emissions.
To be implemented over four years, the policy aims to accelerate electric vehicle adoption across the capital, including both fixed and swappable batteries. Managed by the Transport Department, the policy will have a fully digital framework to deploy direct purchase incentives, scrapping subsidies, phased electrification mandates, and a comprehensive public charging network.
The policy aims to increase EV adoption in key automotive categories, establish an extensive public and private charging network, and facilitate a strong EV supply chain that includes component recovery, battery recycling, and servicing.
Vehicle Categories Covered
In the NCT of Delhi, new registrations for Three-Wheeler Auto-Rickshaws (L5M) and Four-Wheeler Goods Vehicles (N1) would need to be exclusively electric starting January 1, 2027. This mandatory electrification will also apply to all new two-wheeler registrations beginning April 1, 2028. Delhi schools are required to transition their bus fleets to electric vehicles, achieving a 10% share by year two, 20% by year three, and 30% by March 31, 2030.
A Model Approval Committee under the Transport Department is given the responsibility to empanel eligible EV models across vehicle segments for availing incentives under the Policy, with OEMs and manufacturers required to register. During stakeholder consultations, the Commissioner of the Transport Department noted that indigenous manufacturing is being promoted.
Incentive Structure
The GNCTD shall provide incentives to promote electric vehicle adoption in the NCT of Delhi. For Electric Two-Wheelers, the incentives are ₹10,000 per kWh (max ₹30,000) in Year 1, ₹6,600 per kWh (max ₹20,000) in Year 2, and ₹3,300 per kWh (max ₹10,000) in Year 3. This applies to both plug-in and battery-swapping models. For Electric Three-Wheeler Auto-Rickshaws, the incentives are ₹50,000 in Year 1, ₹40,000 in Year 2, and ₹30,000 in Year 3. This applies to both plug-in and battery-swapping models with a battery capacity of more than 4 kWh. For Electric Four-Wheeler Goods Vehicles, the incentives are ₹1,00,000 for N1 above 1.75-ton GVW and ₹50,000 up to 1.75 tons GVW in Year 1. In Year 2, they are ₹75,000 and ₹37,500, respectively. In Year 3, they are ₹50,000 and ₹25,000, respectively.
Scrapping Incentives
Additionally, scrapping incentives are provided under the policy. Electric Two-Wheelers get ₹10,000 for scrapping a Delhi-registered BS-IV or below model when purchasing a new electric vehicle. Electric Three-Wheelers get ₹25,000 when upgrading from a Delhi-registered BS-IV or below model. Electric Cars (Non-Transport) get ₹1,00,000 for scrapping a Delhi-registered BS-IV or below car, provided the new car’s ex-showroom price does not exceed ₹30 lakh and the applicant is among the first 1,00,000 eligible buyers.
Electric Four-Wheeler Goods Carriers get ₹50,000 for scrapping a Delhi-registered BS-IV or below goods carrier. Finally, ₹15,000 is provided for scrapping a Delhi-registered Gramin Sewa vehicle, provided it is replaced with a new electric Gramin Sewa vehicle equipped with Li-ion or advanced battery technology. The first 1,000 privately-owned N2-category electric trucks (excluding government/municipal vehicles) purchased and registered in Delhi within three months of the Policy’s notification will be exempted from no-entry timing restrictions for 10 years from registration. All incentives would be disbursed via direct benefit transfer to buyers through a subsidy portal launched by the CM.
Additional Incentives
All electric vehicles purchased and registered in the NCT of Delhi during the policy period will be granted a 100% exemption from road tax for the vehicle’s life and from registration fees at the time of registration. For electric cars with an ex-showroom price up to ₹30 lakh, this 100% exemption from road tax and registration fees applies till March 31, 2030.
Charging Infrastructure
GNCTD will submit proposals under the PM E-Drive scheme and other Government of India schemes for funding support for charging and battery swapping infrastructure, and will allocate funds to the Power Department to expand public and community charging facilities. Delhi Transco Limited (DTL) shall be the nodal agency for planning, coordinating, and implementing public EV charging and battery swapping infrastructure in Delhi. DTL shall set up a single-window facility to enable faster clearances and expedited EV connections for charge point and battery swapping operators deploying public and semi-public charging stations in Delhi.
Battery Recycling
The policy also covers battery recycling for OEMs to comply with the Battery Waste Management Rules, 2022. The Delhi Pollution Control Committee, as the nodal department, will facilitate the deployment of battery collection centres across Delhi under a PPP model, in collaboration with authorised recyclers and other eligible entities, to enable convenient, accessible, and environmentally sound collection of waste batteries.
The Delhi EV Policy 2026 provides a clear plan for the city’s transition to electric transportation through a combination of purchase incentives, subsidies, tax exemptions, and assistance for charging infrastructure. The policy attempts to address vehicle pollution while creating a self-sustaining EV ecosystem in the capital by combining financial incentives with phased electrification requirements and a robust recycling structure.
by gatewayconsulting | Jun 24, 2026 | BLOG, In the news
New Delhi, 24 June 2026
By Tushar Gandhi
In May, India’s commercial LPG cylinder crossed Rs 3,000 for the first time. The 19-kg cylinder that runs the kitchen of every hotel, restaurant, dhaba, and street food stall now costs Rs 3,071.50 in Delhi, Rs 3,024 in Mumbai, Rs 3,154 in Bengaluru, and Rs 3,237 in Chennai. That is Rs 1,303 more than it did in February, the result of four consecutive monthly price hikes driven by supply disruptions linked to the West Asia conflict. For commercial establishments already operating on thin margins, this is not a passing inconvenience. It is an existential threat to their business.
Across the country, restaurants are truncating menus, removing dishes that take longer to cook or require sustained high heat. Hotels are unable to serve certain items entirely. In a sector where the quality and range of food is the product, the inability to guarantee supply of cooking fuel is a direct threat to revenue, reputation, and operations.
The government has responded with emergency measures – rationing commercial LPG supply, accelerating refinery throughput, and exploring alternative sourcing. While these are the right short-term responses, they do not address the underlying vulnerability. India imports nearly 60% of its LPG, with approximately 90% of those imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Every escalation in West Asia will ripple directly into India’s commercial kitchens.
Ethanol offers a commercially viable, domestically produced alternative that India is already producing at scale.
At Rs 3,071.50 per cylinder, commercial LPG now costs approximately Rs 162 per kg. Cooking-grade bioethanol at 93% purity is currently priced at Rs 55 to 60 per litre. To match the energy output of one kg of LPG, a commercial kitchen needs approximately 2.34 litres of ethanol. At Rs 58 per litre, that works out to approximately Rs 136, roughly 16% cheaper than LPG on an energy parity basis.
That 16% saving matters. For a restaurant using four cylinders a week, the annual LPG bill runs to approximately Rs 6.4 lakh. Switching to ethanol saves approximately Rs 1 lakh annually.
But cost is only part of the argument. Ethanol is domestically produced and available in surplus. A commercial establishment running on ethanol does not face the supply uncertainty that is currently forcing restaurants to turn away customers and shorten menus. The fear of running out of cooking fuel disappears entirely. With the government having already cut commercial LPG supplies to 70% to protect household stocks, this fear is the daily reality for commercial kitchens today.
The economics will only improve over time. A rupee that traded at Rs 86 to the dollar just a year ago now trades at nearly Rs 95, a depreciation of over 10% in twelve months alone. Every litre of ethanol that displaces an LPG import removes this exposure permanently.
At 20% substitution of commercial LPG with ethanol, India avoids importing approximately 590 thousand metric tonnes of LPG annually, saving over Rs 26,000 crore in foreign exchange from a segment accounting for just 9.4% of total LPG consumption.
India’s installed ethanol production capacity is 2,100 crore litres annually and is expected to reach 2,400 crore litres by the end of 2026. The E20 blending programme absorbs approximately 1,050 crore litres per year. Even accounting for all the other end uses like industrial and potable, there is surplus capacity of 500 to 600 crore litres, enough to serve millions of commercial establishments across the country.
Another advantage is that ethanol for cooking requires only 93% purity, compared to 99.5% required for transportation fuel blending, reducing production costs. The supply infrastructure for ethanol cooking exists today, without the need for additional investment, research, or time.
The benefits extend beyond commercial kitchens. India’s ethanol surplus is produced by farmers and distilleries across sugarcane and grain-growing states. Every additional litre of ethanol absorbed by the cooking segment translates directly into assured procurement demand for farmers, supporting rural incomes.
Ethanol cooking is not a new concept, and its viability is not untested. HPCL and IIT Guwahati have jointly developed an ethanol cookstove, and pilots conducted in India have demonstrated that the technology works reliably across diverse conditions.
Globally, the evidence is extensive. In Ethiopia, ethanol cookstoves have been deployed to thousands of households over more than a decade, with validated reductions in particulate matter emissions. In Kenya, pay-as-you-go ethanol distribution networks have reached over a million households across multiple cities at commercial scale. In Uganda, the government expects the majority of the country to be using ethanol for cooking by 2040.
India’s opportunity is structurally stronger than any of these markets, with surplus, existing distribution infrastructure, and a government mandate to reduce import dependence.
The current crisis has created a policy window. Three actions would unlock the ethanol cooking opportunity at commercial scale.
First, formally notify ethanol as an approved cooking fuel under national energy frameworks, with BIS standards specifying the 93% purity grade and stove safety requirements. This single regulatory action removes the largest barrier to commercial adoption, the absence of a legal framework for ethanol as a cooking fuel.
Second, enable oil marketing companies, HPCL, IOCL, and BPCL, to distribute ethanol through their existing commercial LPG networks. India has over 25,000 LPG distributors and 96,000 petrol retail outlets that already reach every commercial establishment in the country.
Third, constitute a government-industry working group to develop a structured commercial rollout framework, starting with hotels, restaurants, and institutional kitchens in cities where commercial LPG consumption is highest.
Ethanol is domestically produced, technically proven, and commercially viable today. India does not need another study. It needs a clear action plan with defined responsibilities for each stakeholder — government, OMCs, distilleries, and stove manufacturers
by admin_xw3245oj | Apr 16, 2026 | In the news
With the West Asia crisis and oil prices spiking, India needs to look much more at alternative fuels, including electric mobility. The government has accelerated procurement of electric buses, citing explicitly the risk of supply disruptions from the ongoing conflict. This is not a future risk.
India has been here before. In 2008, in 2013, and in 2022, Brent crude crossed $100 to $147 per barrel, triggering inflation, rupee depreciation, and widening fiscal and current account deficits. Each time, the response included excise adjustments, monetary tightening, and fiscal consolidation. These measures absorbed each shock without removing the underlying vulnerability. The pattern is well established. What is different today is that the conditions in technology, economics, and policy momentum now exist for India to make a structural choice and move decisively towards energy security.
India imports more than 85% of its crude oil, with a significant share sourced from or transiting through West Asia. India spent $137 billion importing crude oil in FY2024-25, according to data published by the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, ministry of petroleum and natural gas. That figure, equivalent to approximately ₹11.5 lakh crore, represents the annual cost of an energy dependence.
A barrel of crude priced at $80 cost India approximately ₹6,720 when the rupee stood at ₹84 to the dollar. At today’s rate of ₹94, the same barrel costs ₹7,520 — an increase of approximately 12% from currency movement alone, before any change in the global oil price. India imports approximately 4.8 million barrels per day, or 1.75 billion barrels over a full year. At ₹800 more per barrel, currency depreciation is already adding approximately ₹1.40 lakh crore to India’s annual oil import bill.
The transport sector consumes approximately 70% of India’s petroleum products. Within that, two-wheelers account for an estimated 30–35% of India’s total petrol demand — the single largest driver of fuel consumption in the country. According to the ministry of road transport and highways Annual Report 2023-24, there are approximately 260 million registered two-wheelers on India’s roads, growing by roughly 20 million units every year. Each one is a 10–15 year oil import commitment.
The scale becomes clear when you look at individual vehicles. On average, a petrol two-wheeler consumes roughly 2,500 litres over its operational life — approximately ₹2.5 lakh in fuel costs alone at today’s prices, often two to three times the original purchase price of the vehicle. Every litre burned is a dollar of imported crude. Petrol has not got cheaper over any sustained period in India’s history, and the structural forces of rupee depreciation, global demand growth, and supply volatility consistently point in one direction. An electric two-wheeler carries none of this compounding exposure.
No other vehicle segment offers the combination of scale, feasibility, and speed. An electric scooter requires a 2–4 kWh battery, compared with 40–70 kWh for an electric passenger car. The economics already work for urban commuters, charging is done at home overnight on a standard socket.
Three-wheelers deserve equal strategic attention. Auto-rickshaws and cargo three-wheelers are the backbone of last-mile connectivity across India — in cities, in district towns, and in rural areas. They operate long hours, cover high daily distances, and consume fuel disproportionate to their numbers. India sells over 700,000 three-wheelers annually, and operators are acutely price-sensitive, making them naturally motivated to switch when the economics are right. Electric three-wheelers are commercially available, proven, and increasingly cost-competitive. The segment requires financing access and policy continuity, not new technology.
Two concerns are frequently raised about the pace of electrification. The first is that Electric Vehicles (EV) shift dependency from oil to coal. India added more renewable energy capacity last year than in any previous year, and the SHANTI Act, passed by Parliament in December 2025, targets 100 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2047. An EV charged on India’s grid today already produces fewer lifecycle emissions than the same vehicle would have five years ago — because the grid itself is cleaner. That improvement is structural and ongoing.
The second concern — that EVs replace oil dependency with dependency on imported battery cells and rare earth magnets — does not hold up to scrutiny. Oil dependency is recurring and permanent. India imports crude every single day for the entire operational life of every petrol vehicle, with no prospect of a domestic alternative. Cell and magnet dependency is a one-time input per vehicle, and the critical materials in EV batteries can be recovered and recycled at efficiencies of 90–99%, meaning the same materials serve multiple vehicle lives. Globally, Japan, Australia, France, the United States, and Brazil are actively building non-China rare earth supply chains. The dependency is real but transitional.
India’s own policy trajectory reflects the direction of travel. Clean technology passenger vehicles grew at more than double the pace of the overall automobile industry in FY2026, with their share of total sales rising to 29%, up from 9% five years earlier, according to SIAM data. The government’s decision to accelerate electric bus procurement in response to the West Asia crisis demonstrates that the connection between EV adoption and energy security is understood at the policy level. The data on two and three-wheelers makes an equally compelling case. Delhi’s draft EV Policy 2026, released on April 11, makes the same argument. It proposes banning new ICE two-wheeler registrations from April 2028 and three-wheelers from January 2027 — citing that two-wheelers alone constitute 67% of the capital’s vehicle stock. What Delhi is proposing as a city-level air quality measure is, at the national scale, an energy security imperative.
India has absorbed oil price shocks before — in 2008, in 2013, in 2022. Each time the response was calibrated to manage the impact. Each time the structural exposure remained. The current moment is not categorically different in origin, but it is different in the options available. The technology exists, the economics are compelling, and the scale of the opportunity in two and three-wheelers is unmatched by any other intervention available to policymakers today.
by admin_xw3245oj | Mar 11, 2026 | In the news
Restaurants, hotels and eateries are running out of cooking gas. Indian Hotel & Restaurant Association (AHAR) says 20% of establishments in Mumbai have shut due to disrupted commercial LPG supply, warning that closures could reach 50% if the shortage continues. In Delhi-NCR, commercial cylinders are reportedly selling on the black market for up to ₹1,500.
The crunch, of course, stems from the US-Israel war against Iran and the ensuing conflict in West Asia that has disrupted tanker movement through the Hormuz Strait, route for 85-90% of India’s LPG imports. Domestic LPG prices have risen by ₹60 in a week, pushing a 14.2 kg cylinder in Delhi to ₹913, the highest since August 2023.
With 62% of domestic LPG demand met through imports, this disruption was always a matter of when, not if. The crisis in commercial kitchens, however, is only the visible tip of the iceberg. India’s cooking fuel vulnerability runs far deeper.
India has made progress under Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY), connecting 32.99 cr households to LPG, including 10.33 cr subsidised connections. Yet, universal clean cooking remains elusive. About 500 mn people – nearly 40% of the population – rely on biomass fuels. Household air pollution from these fuels contributes to an estimated 1.2 mn premature deaths annually. Even within LPG-connected households, the ₹913-a-cylinder price – ₹613 for PMUY beneficiaries – pushes low-income households back to firewood and dung, particularly in rural areas where these fuels are available.
To sustain LPG usage among the poorest, GoI has committed ₹12,000 cr in PMUY subsidies for 2025-26, and sanctioned an additional ₹30,000 cr in compensation to IOCL, BPCL and HPCL for under-recoveries on domestic LPG sales. This is the fiscal cost of a system structurally dependent on imported fuel.
While India scrambles to secure LPG supply, its ethanol distilleries are operating below full capacity. India’s ethanol production capacity has grown to 1,822 cr litres, supported by about 500 distilleries nationwide. The E20 blending programme requires 1,016 cr litres annually, leaving a substantial surplus available for other applications.
Critically, cooking applications don’t require anhydrous fuel-grade ethanol at 99.9% purity. 90-95% purity suffices, which lowers both production costs and the barrier to scaling. Diverting about 250 cr litres toward cooking would serve nearly 20 mn households without compromising E20 blending targets. The infrastructure to produce, store and move ethanol across India already exists.
Ethanol burns cleanly, producing primarily CO2 and water vapour, with zero PM2.5, and negligible toxic emissions compared to biomass. Centre for Science and Environment estimates that household cooking emissions in India exceed 350 mn tonnes of CO2 annually, surpassing the entire transport sector. Ethanol clean cooking directly addresses this at scale.
India’s 4.5 mn street food vendors represent a compelling entry point for ethanol cooking deployment. These vendors operate in public spaces where LPG use is often restricted due to explosion risk. Ethanol stoves carry no such risk. Transitioning 1.1-1.3 mn urban vendors from biomass or kerosene to ethanol could reduce 3-4 mn tonnes of CO2 annually, while materially improving occupational health and food safety outcomes.
The technology is ready, and its effectiveness is not untested. HPCL and IIT Guwahati have developed an ethanol-fuelled cookstove, and HPCL has announced plans for ethanol ATMs at retail outlets to enable household refills. A pilot in the Sundarbans tested ethanol stoves among households entirely dependent on forest wood, demonstrating viability in resource-constrained, off-grid environments. States are in active conversations about district-level pilots, with existing inter-state ethanol logistics. For example, Karnataka alone has an installed capacity of 270 cr litres, providing a ready supply chain.
UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO) Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP) has documented bioethanol clean-cooking programmes. Validated pilots in Ethiopia and Mozambique – both resource-constrained with high biomass dependence – have demonstrated that ethanol cooking is technically viable, socially acceptable and replicable across diverse geographies. India, with its far larger distillery base, superior logistics infrastructure and existing policy frameworks, is better positioned than any of these countries to deploy ethanol cooking at national scale.
India’s ethanol ecosystem has matured. But the policy framework has not kept pace. Two specific steps are needed:
- GoI should designate bioethanol as an approved cooking fuel under PMUY, enabling its integration into the existing subsidy and distribution architecture.
- 3 state-level pilots should be commissioned, drawing on existing distillery capacity, oil marketing companies (OMC) distribution networks, and stove technology validated at scale.
The fiscal arithmetic is unambiguous. Sustaining LPG import dependence at 62% costs over ₹42,000 cr annually in subsidies and under-recoveries. It leaves India structurally exposed to geopolitical shocks, as the current West Asian crisis has demonstrated. Bioethanol cooking is not a replacement for LPG. It is a domestically produced, import-independent complement that India’s distilleries can supply today.
The capacity exists. The technology exists. The crisis to justify urgency is on every front page this week. What is needed now is a policy decision.
by gatewayconsulting | Feb 17, 2026 | BLOG, In the news
New Delhi, 17 February 2026
By Tannaz Ahmed and Tushar Gandhi
India’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) notified the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026 [1] on 10 February 2026, bringing synthetically generated information (SGI), within India’s statutory due diligence framework for intermediaries. Effective from 20 February 2026, the notification amends certain sections of the previous rules and are brought about to strengthen regulatory oversight of digital intermediaries and online content platforms, enhance accountability and user safety in the digital ecosystem. The framework aims to address risks associated with deepfakes, misinformation, data security vulneravilities, fraud, and rapid virality of unlawful content.
The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026 have introduced a structured regulatory framework with the following core proposals:
- Formal definition and regulation of synthetically generated information (SGI): The rules establish a legal definition for audio, visual, or audio-visual AI-generated or algorithmically manipulated content and bring such content under the regulatory ambit for the first time.
- Exclusions: Pure text content alone is not included under SGI, although it may still fall under other unlawful content provisions depending on context/law violated [2]. Routine or good-faith edits [3], accessibility enhancements, and ordinary formatting are explicitly excluded as long as they do not materially distort meaning.
- Mandatory labeling and metadata requirements: Digital platforms would need to prominently label SGI as “AI-generated” or “synthetic” and embed metadata/unique identifiers to indicate origin; platforms are prohibited from removing or suppressing such labels once applied.
- Accelerated content takedown timelines: The timeline for intermediaries to remove unlawful content after receiving a court order or government notice has been sharply reduced (e.g., from 24–36 hours to 3 hours), with shorter windows for highly sensitive content like non-consensual intimate imagery or deepfakes (mention timeline here, in consistency with the earlier timeline mentioned).
- Enhanced due-diligence obligations: Significant social media intermediaries must verify SGI disclosures by users and ensure compliance with the labeling, metadata, and removal requirements to maintain legal safe harbour protections under the IT Act.
- Expanded accountability and enforcement: Failure to comply with the amended rules can result in loss of intermediary safe harbour protections, increasing platforms’ legal exposure for user-generated content.
Definitional Clarity vs. Detection Complexity
The amendments define “synthetically generated information” as artificially created or altered audio, visual, or audio-visual content that appears real and is likely to deceive viewers into believing it depicts a real person or event. The emphasis is on deceptive realism rather than the mere use of AI.
Translating this definition into automated detection systems is likely to be inherently complex as determining whether content is “likely to deceive” requires contextual assessment. This gap between statutory language and algorithmic enforcement represents the first implementation challenge where legal clarity does not automatically translate into technical measurability.
The Two-Tier Model and Verification
The framework distinguishes between:
- Unlawful SGI, which platforms must not allow (e.g., child sexual abuse material, non-consensual intimate imagery, forged documents, impersonation, arms-related content, deceptive political deepfakes).
- Permitted SGI, which may be hosted if clearly labelled and embedded with provenance mechanisms [4], where technically feasible.
This two-tier model replaces earlier draft proposal [5], specifically draft Rule 3(3) on labelling and metadata requirements and draft Rule 4(1A) on user declarations and verification, which focused on prominently identifying SGI but did not explicitly differentiate between unlawful and permissible synthetic content, effectively allowing all synthetic content to remain online if it met the labelling criteria.
For Significant Social Media Intermediaries (SSMIs), obligations extend further. They must:
- Obtain user declarations on whether uploaded content is SGI.
- Deploy technical measures to verify such declarations.
- Ensure labelling prior to display or publication.
This creates compliance responsibilities. The implementation challenge lies in verifying declarations across high-volume uploads. Self-declaration mechanisms are susceptible to misuse, while automated verification tools may generate false positives or false negatives.
The rules also require “reasonable and appropriate technical measures, including automated tools or other suitable mechanisms, to prevent users from creating, modifying, sharing, or disseminating synthetically generated information that violates any law in force.” However, they do not set uniform technical standards for detection or watermarking. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, in its 254th Report on Cyber Crime [6], recommended uniform technical standards for media provenance and expansion of indigenous detection tools, including C-DAC’s Deepfake Detection Tool.
The effectiveness of provenance mechanisms depends on interoperability and resilience, as metadata can be stripped through screenshots, re-encoding, cross-platform sharing, or compression. Without uniform and tamper-resistant standards, labels risk being platform-bound rather than ecosystem-wide. Implementation therefore hinges on technical standardisation and cross-platform coordination, challenges that extend beyond the text of the rules.
Proactive Moderation and Safe Harbour
Under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, intermediaries enjoy “safe harbour” protection, granting them immunity from liability for third-party content, provided they exercise due diligence and do not knowingly host unlawful material. The 2026 amendments (Rule 2(1B)) clarify that intermediaries who remove or disable access to content, including synthetically generated information, in compliance with the rules, including via automated tools and in good faith, will not be considered in violation of safe harbour provisions under Section 79(2) of the Act.
This clarification encourages preventive governance. However, it also intensifies implementation pressure.
The expectation that platforms “not allow any user to create, generate, modify, alter, publish, transmit, share, or disseminate” unlawful SGI signals a shift from reactive notice-and-takedown toward preventive design. Operationally, this requires:
- Scalable automated detection systems.
- Real-time moderation pipelines.
- Trained human review teams.
- Internal escalation protocols capable of responding within hours.
The preservation of safe harbour depends not merely on policy adoption but demonstrable compliance. This raises documentation and audit burdens.
Compressed Timelines and Response Capacity
The amendments significantly tighten compliance timelines:
- Removal within three hours upon court or authorised government notice.
- Grievance disposal within seven days.
- Action within 36 hours, and within two hours in certain sensitive categories.
The rules also mandate that intermediaries issue user advisories at least once every three months, warning users about SGI misuse, illegal content, and penalties.
Implementation requires continuous monitoring, 24/7 response teams, and close coordination between legal and technical divisions. Global platforms operating across time zones may find uniform compliance with India-specific timelines particularly challenging.
Smaller intermediaries face substantial cost and staffing pressures. Deploying automated detection tools, maintaining grievance redressal officers, preserving logs, and meeting compressed timelines imposes burdens that larger platforms may absorb more easily.
Meeting these timelines is not just procedural; it may require robust internal escalation protocols, real-time moderation pipelines, and trained human review teams working alongside automated detection systems. Together, these factors make operational execution the key determinant of regulatory effectiveness.
Overall Assessment
India’s deepfake amendments mark a decisive move toward preventive governance of synthetic media.
Deepfake regulation is no longer about defining deception; it is about engineering traceability, synchronising enforcement, scaling detection tools, and maintaining procedural safeguards under compressed timelines.
As synthetic media becomes increasingly sophisticated, regulatory effectiveness will depend less on intent and more on operational execution. The law is now in place. Its durability will depend on whether institutions, platforms, and enforcement agencies can translate obligation into practice.
[1] Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026
[2] FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS on The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026
[3] Routine or good faith actions such as editing, formatting, enhancement, technical correction, colour adjustment, noise reduction, transcription, or compression.
[4] Includes a unique identifier, to identify the computer resource of the intermediary used to create, generate, modify or alter such information.
[5] [Proposed Amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 in relation to synthetically generated information
[6] Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs. (2025, August 25). “Cyber Crime – Ramifications, Protection and Prevention”. Report no. 254
